Imperial Telegraph Administration were all defense oriented, but unlike the provincial arsenals they were organized on a profit-making basis and competed successfully against foreign companies. 5 Similar to Hatano's discussion of late Qing industry, Itô Shûichi ¥ì ÃÃ ¨q @ has contended that science and technology in late Qing China required the dethronement of the official dynastic orthodoxy and civil examination reform before they could be advanced. In Itô's view, although they served as a catalyst of the modern intellectual revolution in China, the publication of translated Western scientific works and technical books and the creation of new technical schools after 1865 contributed to the spread of Western social and political ideas among Chinese intellectuals, but the translations per se produced no scientists or engineers. 6 To challenge such negative views of the imperial Chinese state in Japanese scholarship, the eminent sinologist Miyazaki Ichisada ®c±T¥«©w , had written an earlier essay to refute claims that Qing bureaucratic control had ruined most of China's early modern industrial enterprises. According to Miyazaki, it had been Li Hongzhang's §õÂE__ (1823-1901) desire to check foreign domination of shipping in China that had motivated him to sponsor the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company in 1872. As a guandu shangban ©x ·_ °Ó ¿ì (officially supervised and merchant operated) enterprise, the China Merchants' Company actually was a government venture, according to Miyazaki. Supported by a total of 2.15 million taels (3 million silver dol- 5 Hatano Yoshihiro, "Chûgoku kindaishi ni kansuru mitsu no mondai -Chûgoku no kindaika wa naze okureta ka" °ê ªñ ¥N ¥v ÇR Ãö Ç@ Çr T ÇK ÇU °_ ÃD --°ê ÇU ªñ ¥N AE ÇV _ó ¬G AE_ AEõ Çs ÇF AEñ (Three questions concerning modern Chinese history -Why was China's modernization late?), Nagoya daigaku bungakubu kenkyû ronshû _W ¥j «Î j _Ç å _Ç _¡ ¬ã ¨s __ ¶°, _ú ¥v 7 (1958): 29-61. See also Hatano, Chûgoku kindai kôgyô shi no kenkyû °ê ªñ ¥N u ·~ ¥v ÇU ¬ã ¨s (Research on the history of modern Chinese industry) (Kyoto, 1960 6 Itô Shûichi, "Kindai Chûgoku ni okeru kagaku gijutsu no chii -sono shisôshi teki kôsatsu" ªñ ¥N °ê ÇR AE_ AE÷ Çr ¬ì _Ç §_ _N ÇU _a _ì -ÇD ÇU «ä ·Q ¨Ï ªº _Ò _î (The place of science and technology in modern Chinaan examination of its intellectual history), Tôyô gakujutsu kenkyû ªF ¬v _Ç _N ¬ã ¨s 5, 5-6 (1967): 65-77.
In her revisionist account of the Jiangnan Arsenal, Meng Yue has described how for Zeng Guofan ´¿ °ê Ã¿(1811-72), Li Hongzhang, and their advisors the manufacture of machines represented the fundamental building block for industry. In their view the three basic ingredients for constructing such a new industry were: 1) manufacturing machines; 2) creating a new institutional category of engineers, lit., "machine workers"); and third, the translation of scientific and technical texts. Via armaments manufacture, the Qing state would break the Western monopoly of warships and cannons and master contemporary useful knowledge.
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Technical work at the arsenal was left in hands of foreigners such as the American T. F.
Falls, Hunt's chief engineer, who was the superintendent. Eight of Hunt's machinists were retained, and six hundred workers from Hunt and Company were transferred directly to the Jiangnan Arsenal. Many others were later added. They produced serviceable muskets and small howitzers after initial failures in rifle production. By mid-1867 the arsenal was producing fifteen muskets and a hundred twelve-pound shrapnel daily. Twelve-pound howitzers were produced at rate of eighteen per month and used as munitions in the Nien Rebellion of the 1860s. In 1871 the arsenal finally produced breech-loading rifles of the Remington type. By end of 1873, 4,200 were produced, but they were more costly and proved inferior to imported Remingtons. In 1874-75 Li Hongzhang advised establishing a branch to produce powder and cartridges instead. hope that its graduates would go on to pass the more prestigious civil examinations. Hence, the school attracted the sons of Shanghai merchants and Christian converts in a more foreign environment. Arsenal students were also drilled in the 8-legged essay at the same time that mathematics was given high priority. For the latter, the "Ten Computational Canons," several of which had been reconstituted by Qing scholars in the eighteenth century, were used to teach traditional Chinese mathematics.
Students studied Western algebra, geometry, trigonometry, astronomy, and mechanics in the lower division curriculum. They were also provided training in international law, geography, and mechanical drawing. The upper-division curriculum for students emphasized seven fields: 1) mineralogy and metallurgy; 2) metal casting and forging; 3) wood and iron manufacturing; 4) machinery design and operation; 5) navigation; 6) naval and land warfare; and 7) foreign languages, customs, institutions. It took three years to complete the two divisions. Outstanding graduates, it was hoped, would then take special provincial exams in Beijing. 
Shipbuilding in the Jiangnan Arsenal
From 1868 to 1876, according to Meng Yue, shipbuilding in the Jiangnan Arsenal was highly productive, when eleven ships were built in eight years. Ten were warships. Five of these had wooden hulls; the other five were provided iron hulls. All parts of each ship, including the engine, were built at the arsenal. The arsenal also experimented with different designs, from single to double-screw, wooden and iron hulls, and simple warships to turreted vessels. When compared to the warships made in the Yokosuka Dockyard in Japan in the 1870s, the level of shipbuilding technology at the Jiangnan Arsenal was actually higher than that in the leading Japanese dockyard.
The Yokosuka Dockyard did not produce its largest wooden warships until 1887-88. Two were armed with twelve guns and boasted 1,622 horsepower. Neither was the match for the largest warship built at the Jiangnan Arsenal in 1872, which had 1,800 horsepower and was armed with twenty-six guns. Five iron-hulled warships were produced at the Jiangnan Arsenal before 1875, while the first iron Japanese gunboats were not completed until after 1887. In terms of armaments, those manufactured at the Jiangnan Arsenal also were by and large superior to that of Japan. 16 Overall, however, the Chinese fleet of iron and wooden ships quickly fell behind the new ironclad ships of Europe. Moreover, the compound engine in Europe replaced the outmoded single or double-screw engines in Chinese vessels, which China did not begin to build until 1877.
An earlier proposal was turned down because of the lack of funds. Hence, China's ships were still behind Europe's in the 1870s. Moreover, because Chinese shipyards could not produce enough ships, more warships were built in Europe for the Chinese navy. Although foreign technicians were again employed for building large modern warships, by the 1890s Chinese ships were still outmoded because Chinese training could not keep pace with Western technological progress.
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Shipbuilding in the Jiangnan Arsenal dramatically slowed after 1876. In 1885, after the Arsenal completed its first steel gunboat, it ceased to be a military shipyard. The technological switch toward steel and armored warships in Europe highlighted the difficulty of transporting iron and coal from inland provinces to make steel in coastal China. At the same time imported steel remained prohibitively expensive to make the ships domestically. Nevertheless, shipbuilding technology in Jiangnan and the Fuzhou Navy Yard probably remained slightly better than in Japanese arsenals until 1889, when French engineers came to Japan and designed new steel and iron warships for the Yokosuka Dockyard. Its first modern warship had more horsepower and a higher top speed than the same type of warship built by the Jiangnan Arsenal.
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Once shipbuilding was no longer its major task, the Jiangnan Arsenal adapted its machinery to produce the most advanced foreign guns and small arms for military use. As of 1874, the arsenal had produced a total of 110 cannons and a variety of guns modeled after products from the Armstrong factory in Britain. Three types of large 120 mm, 175 mm, and 200 mm caliber muzzle-loading guns made by the Arsenal were deployed at the Wusong fort guarding the mouth of the Yangzi River. In the late 1880s, the Arsenal produced large breech-loading guns that ini- tially used black and then later brown gunpowder. By 1885, Li Hongzhang favored the German arms industry over the British, and the scale of Krupp arms sales to China increased.
Before the Sino-Japanese War, the Jiangnan Arsenal was producing large breech-loading Armstrong guns whose range went from 7,000 to 11,000 yards, and which were capable of firing projectiles from 80 to 800 lbs. The Arsenal also became known after 1890 for its success in producing the rapid-firing machine gun, which was important in enhancing sea power and coastal defense forts. By 1892 the Jiangnan Arsenal had manufactured ten 40-pound rapid-firing guns.
Two years later, the arsenal finished making rapid-firing machine guns capable of launching 40-pound and 100-pound shells. Because annual production in the Arsenal was insufficient to supply the Chinese army, the Qing military still had purchase such arms from abroad. According to Meng Yue, Japan by comparison did not begin its ambitious artillery program until 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War.
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The Fuzhou Navy Yard Besides the Jiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai, the second major industrial site for shipbuilding and training in the Western sciences and technology was the Fuzhou Naval Yard. When Zuo Zongtang submitted his 1866 memorial to establish a complete navy yard at Fuzhou the expectation was that after five years the need for foreign experts would be eliminated. The estimated start up costs of 300 thousand taels (417 thousand silver dollars) and the 600 thousand taels (834 thousand silver dollars) for annual operations were to come from maritime customs duties and the inter-provincial trade taxes (lijin) collected in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Guangdong provinces. From the start, Zuo and his successor Shen Baozhen ¨H ¸ ¶ ·© (1820-79) relied on French expertise in contrast to the British influence at the Jiangnan Arsenal. Once the navy yard was established, however, only 400 thousand taels (556 thousand silver dollars) were raised from the Fujian maritime customs, with another 50 thousand (69.5 thousand silver dollars) per month for operations, leaving the venture in a perpetual financial bind. At its peak the shipyard employed 3,000 workers in the navy yard. When later construction was completed the force was dropped to 1,900, with 600 in the dockyard, 800 in workshops, and 500 coolies. Some 500 soldiers guarded the premises. The navy yard had more than 45 buildings on 118 acres set aside for administrative, educational, and production purposes. By comparison, the Jiangnan Arsenal as largest ordnance enterprise in 1875 had 32 such buildings on 73 acres. 20 In terms of scale, the Fuzhou Navy Yard was probably the leading industrial venture in late Qing China. Designed as a Westernized enterprise based on machinery and efficiency, the whole plant was served by a tramway with turntables at important workshops and intersections.
The Navy Yard's goal was to build a modern Chinese flotilla between 1868 and 1875. Nineteen In the first group of 105 beginning students, only thirty-nine remained at the end of 1873. A second group of eight graduates were sent out in late 1882 for three years of advanced training. Five studied fortifications, defenses, and gunpowder explosives in France; two studied navigation and naval command in England; and one went to Germany for training in naval mines 25 Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China, pp. 214-19. and torpedoes. A third group of thirty-three graduates were sent in 1886, with ten from the English division, fourteen the from French division, and nine from the Tianjin yard. Thirty completed their training; eighteen studied hydrography, ironclad warship navigation, naval artillery and small arms in England; twelve studied hulls and engines, mathematics and ship construction, river control, bridge and railway construction, and international law in France. A fourth group was scheduled to go to Europe in 1894, but the war with Japan interrupted that.
In 1874 , as twenty-one year-old graduate, Yan Fu ÄY ´_ (1853-1921), for instance, was acting captain of a small steamer owned by the Fujian-Zhejiang administration but not built by the Fuzhou Navy Yard. As a graduate of the Fuzhou naval division, however, Yan was eligible to receive advanced training in Europe. On his return to China he became a dean and professor of navigation and mathematics for many years at the Fuzhou Navy Yard. In the early 1880s he became professor of navigation and mathematics in Tianjin Naval Academy where he was a teacher and administrator for nearly 20 years. After the bitter defeat to Japan in the SinoJapanese War, an 1896 recommendation that foreign teachers should be hired in China rather than sending students to Europe was considered, but the Zongli yamen still wished to send the best naval students to Europe for advanced training. Ten were sent in 1897 for six years of training, but only six went to France. They were recalled in 1900 after 3 years due to insufficient funds. exceeded original estimates, partly due to high costs for foreign wages, which used up 12 thousand taels (16.7 thousand silver dollars) out of the monthly operation cost of between 50 thousand (69.5 thousand silver dollars) and 80 thousand (111.2 thousand silver dollars) taels. By contrast, the total wages of two thousand Chinese workmen amounted to only ten thousand taels Besides their use in the increasing number of missionary schools, such studies were also institutionalized as texts within a regional matrix of arsenals, factories, and technical schools that formed the nineteenth century roots of the twentieth century industrial revolution in China.
Hence, we should also acknowledge the scope and scale of scientific translation and military arsenals elsewhere in China after 1860. A sampling of these empire-wide venues includes the following:
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• Anqing Arsenal (1861), set up by Zeng Guofan.
• Beijing Field Force Arsenal (1883).
• Daye Iron Mine (1890), in Hubei.
• Fuzhou Shipyard (1866), the base for the Southern Fleet, established by Zuo Zongtang.
• Guangzhou Arsenal (1874).
• Hangzhou Arsenal (1885).
• Hanyang Ironworks, in Hubei (1890), established by Zhang Zhidong .
• Hanyang Arsenal (1892).
• Hunan Arsenal (1875).
• Jiangnan Arsenal (1865), set up in Shanghai by Zeng and Li Hongzhang. • Jilin Arsenal (1881).
• Jinling Arsenal (1867) in Nanjing used for making breech rifles and steel.
• Lanzhou Arsenal (1871).
• Shandong Arsenal (1875), used for gun purchase, making acid and gun powder.
• Sichuan Arsenal (1877).
• Tianjin Arsenal (1867), under Li Hongzhang used as gunpowder factory and to manufacture acid.
• Taiwan Arsenal (1885).
• Weihaiwei Shipyard (1882), the base for the Beiyang Fleet in "Port Arthur."
• Yunnan Arsenal (1884)
• Xian Arsenal (1869). The Jiangnan Arsenal and the Fuzhou Shipyard, for example, were generally acknowledged by contemporary Europeans and Japanese to be more advanced than their chief competitor in Meiji Japan, the Yokosuka Dockyard, until the 1880s. David Pong has contended, for instance, that had the Qing navy engaged the Japanese in a naval battle over Taiwan in 1874-75, when the Japanese threatened the island in April 1874, Chinese maritime defense preparations would have gained greater support. Due to a policy debate, however, the Chinese sued for peace to avoid hostilities with the result that the budget for the two modern naval fleets in north and south China was cut to four million taels (5.56 million silver dollars), much less than was needed. We have seen above that the mid-1870s saw a cutback in the production of ships in both the Jiangnan Arsenal and Fuzhou Shipyard. By the late 1870s China's armaments industries were mainly producing ammunition. Besides financial difficulties, corruption was also rife among leading officials who competed with each other for the remaining funds.
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According to John Rawlinson, only three Japanese ships with about 3,600 men were in the 1874 Japanese expedition to Taiwan. The Japanese naval ministry was established in 1872, and by 1874 it had just seventeen ordinary ships with an aggregate of about 14,000 tons. Foreign observers thought China's twenty-one steamers in the one thousand ton class would be able to handle the Japanese threat, but, as in 1894-95, the Chinese ships were not organized into a unified fleet.
Since it would take time to gather a fleet in Taiwan, and because he wrongly feared that Japan had two ironclad warships, Shen Baochen as the Director-general of the Fuzhou Navy Yard agreed to end the crisis with a financial payment to Japan and de facto recognition of Japanese control over the Liuqiu (Ryûkyû) Islands. By 1879, China had two ironclad steamships, which had been ordered from the Vulcan factory in the Baltic for the Northern Beiyang Fleet and were more advanced than anything the Japanese navy had at the time. They were both sunk in and weight in a single salvo, while Japan had an advantage in speed of ships and metal thrown in a sustained exchange of salvos. Japan had more quick-firing guns that could fire three times the weight of metal from China's 6" to 12" guns.
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Technology was not the key determinant of the outcome, according to Rawlinson. Japan proved to be superior in naval leadership, ship maneuverability, and the availability of explosive shells. Some observers described the Fuzhou-trained officers as cowards, and they were the dominant Chinese group because of their experience and training when compared to the Tianjintrained officers, few of whom were captains. In 1892, for example, most engine-room appointments still went to Fuzhou graduates. Nine of the twelve captains of the Beiyang ships that fought Japan at mouth of the Yalu were Fuzhou graduates. Rawlinson, however, has contended that cowardice was not the decisive factor. He has noted that China fired 197 12" projectiles at the decisive naval battle of Yalu, with half of them being solid shot rather than explosive shell.
They scored ten hits with six shots and four shells.
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From smaller guns, Chinese fired 482 shots and registered 58 hits, 22 on one ship, the Hiyei. They also launched 5 torpedoes without hits. China scored about 10% of her tries. The Japanese, on the other hand, with their quick-firers scored about 15% of their tries. In addition, the Chinese were hampered by woeful shortages of ammunition especially for her ships' big guns.
Some were filled with cement, e.g., the one that struck the Matsushima and the two that passed through the Saikyo. This suggests to Rawlinson that there were serious corruption problems in Li clear that the speed and rapidity of fire were more important at Yalu than the weight of the vessel and its armor.
Shore engagements continued after the battle at the Yalu as the Japanese took advantage of their decisive victory at sea. Li Hongzhang now sought to rebuild his navy minus the Weihaiwei naval port. The poor command structure of the Beiyang Fleet and the lack of a court martial system made it impossible to place blame on officers and allocate reward properly, although many were made scapegoats for the defeat. Moreover, the Qing personnel system of naval rewards and punishments was filled with inequity and unpredictability. Many Chinese captains and officers simply committed suicide. No one dared to question the command structure or demand of the Manchu emperor a board of review independent of the navy.
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The Sino-Japanese War generated intense Japanese self-confidence after 1895. Moreover, Japanese industrialization accelerated after the Qing dynasty was forced to pay a sizable indemnity to the Meiji regime. Wider Western notice of the smaller island kingdom that had defeated the Chinese empire also came with the victory. For the Japanese public, the war victory developed into the key event that energized the newly emergent Meiji press, and drowned out editorial debate over the war. Public enthusiasm for military adventures became a common feature when the dissemination of the national news became a central feature of the Japanese press after 1895.
There were by then 600 thousand newspaper subscribers altogether in Tokyo and Osaka alone.
The Japanese victory over China echoed throughout the country and demonstrated to Japanese the preeminence of Meiji Japan in East Asia.
The shift to an information press in Meiji Japan that grew out of news accounts of the Sino-Japanese War stimulated the demand for news and information in a new, unified Japanese language. The Hakubunkai ¥Õ å ·| Publishing House, for example, took advantage of the outbreak of war and quickly published a tri-monthly, illustrated record in September 1894 entitled the Nisshin sensô jikki é _M _Ô ª § é °O (Diary of the Japanese war with Qing China), which was enormously popular and helped create a cult of Japanese war heroes. Other publishers quickly followed suit, and novels, plays and woodblock printed posters about the war became best-sellers. The Yomiuri shimbun Åª _ae ·s »D newspaper initiated a prize competition for the "best" anti-Chinese war songs. 43 In a completely opposite way, the naval disaster at the Yalu River and the decisive Qing With Allen as editor, the Wan'guo gongbao was published weekly in Beijing from 1874 and monthly after 1889.
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In the essay, Allen had traced China's backwardness to three root causes: 1) superstition (mixin °g «H) ; 2) opium (yapian _~ ù) ; and 3) civil examinations (keju ¬ì Á| ). In this series, he also stressed the importance of science as a corrective for the causes of China's backwardness.
Native studies had, according to Allen, failed to grasp the universal lessons of modern science. In particular, China's assimilation of Western science was missing the importance of "study of the principles of things" (wuli zhi xue ª« _z § _Ç), or what in the late 1890s would be called "physics," which by then was based on Japanese translations of Western scientific texts.
46
The Sino-Japanese War also provoked a dramatic switch in John Fryer's confidence about Oriental Languages position at Berkeley University, which he would be offered in July, Fryer explained that his position in China had been strengthened because of China's defeat in the war.
A "strong tide of demand for Western learning" was now evident among Chinese literati, who
were "becoming aware of their own gross ignorance of modern arts and sciences." He added to
Kellogg: "My translations are being bought up as fast as they can be printed, and education conducted on Western principles is becoming the order of the day. It is for this tide that I have waited patiently year after year, and now it has begun to flow it would seem almost wrong to absent myself from the country that has so long afforded me a home and for those whose enlightenment I have so long been working."
Why then entertain a teaching position at Berkeley University at this promising time?
Earlier in 1880 Fryer had rejected the possibility that English would become a universal language or that China would be ruled by foreign powers. In his 1895 letter, however, Fryer explained why he now entertained accepting the Berkeley position: "However necessary it may be for China to have the arts and sciences of the West translated into the native language and disseminated throughout the country in the first instance, it stands to reason that this will only succeed up to a point. Beyond that point no amount of translation can keep pace with the requirements of this age of progress." The "complete education of China" had begun through translation, Fryer quipped, but that was only a first step.
The man who had tirelessly translated several score of works on science and technology into Chinese now assumed a more strident tone. The war had proven to him and the Chinese that their efforts since 1865 had been a failure. Fryer now became a voice of doom for China's future:
Of course this looks to the gradual decay of the Chinese language and literature, and with them the comparative uselessness of my many years of labor. Their doom seems to be inevitable, for only the fittest can survive. It may take many generations to accomplish, but sooner or later the end must come, and English be the learned language of the Empire. 47 This intriguingly timed Darwinian perspective belied the religious message of a natural theology that Fryer and other missionaries were encoding in their earlier translations of botany and biology for the Chinese that I ill discuss elsewhere.
On the eve of his departure for California, Fryer now publicly announced a competition for "new age novels" (xin xiaoshuo ·s p »¡ ) in Chinese that would enhance the morals of China and eviscerate the triple evils of opium, stereotypical examination essays, and footbinding. This If, however, we look more carefully at the total picture of the self-strengthening period from 1865 to 1895, the view that Qing China was irrevocably weak and backward, in contrast to a powerful and industrialized Europe and a rapidly industrializing Japan, is an artifact of the impact of the Sino-Japanese War after 1895 on international and domestic opinion. Impatient perspectives of China's efforts to westernize after 1865, unfortunately, underestimate the crucial role
